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Abstract
We develop a method to structurally estimate principal-agent mod-
els by ordinary least squares (OLS). We set up a general principal-
agent model which explicitly incorporates the wealth levels of each
party and the opportunity cost to the agent of entering the contract.
This yields an optimal contract that is linearized by way of an Nth
order Taylor approximation. This in turn imposes
N(3N￿1)
2 restric-
tions on the parameters and yields an empirical test of the canonical
principal-agent model. In the application, we consider the case where
N = 2 and apply our method to a sample of land tenancy contracts in
rural Madagascar. Empirical tests lead to consistent failure to reject
the hypotheses derived from our structural model, which lends support
to our structural method as well as to the canonical principal-agent
model.
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11 Introduction
In recent years, applied microeconomists have often struggled with reconcil-
ing the theoretical and empirical strands of the literature on contracts. Much
of this struggle has stemmed from the inherent di¢ culty in measuring the
variables necessary to properly test the canonical principal-agent model, let
alone cutting-edge models that either seek to relax the axioms of expected
utility theory or that seek to impose more structure on the data. Acker-
berg and Botticini (2002), for instance, incorporate wealth levels into their
contract choice equation in an e⁄ort to account for the respective risk pref-
erences of the principal and the agent. Because wealth only proxies for an
individual￿ s coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion, however, and because prin-
cipals and agents are very likely to match endogenously with one another
along their risk preferences, then the estimated coe¢ cients from a contract
choice equation ignoring this endogenous matching problem are biased. In
other words, because risk preferences are di¢ cult if not impossible to derive
from survey data, estimation of a simple contract choice equation is anything
but straightforward.1
While solutions to such problems are important, it is also necessary to de-
rive valid tests of the canonical model itself if we are to e⁄ectively use properly
measured data and thus to understand the applicability of the principal-agent
model. The contribution of this paper is thus to derive a structural method
to estimate a principal-agent model by OLS. The obvious advantage of such
a method is to free the econometrician from having to make strong functional
form assumptions. Indeed, while the structural literature on contracts has
generated important methodological contributions (see, for example, Ferrall
and Shearer, 1999; Margiotta and Miller, 2000; Paarsch and Shearer, 2000;
and Vera-HernÆndez, 2003), it is not always obvious how robust empirical re-
sults are to changes in functional forms. This paper thus presents some of the
theoretical implications of including a set of observable variables in principal-
agent models. As is shown below, these theoretical implications provide a
simple empirical test of the validity of the canonical principal-agent model
as well as a convenient means of accurately estimating the determinants of
contract choice.
1Even if wealth were to accurately proxy for absolute or relative risk aversion, Bellemare
and Brown (2008) show that tests of risk sharing relying on wealth as a proxy for risk
aversion are almost always unidenti￿ed.
2The goal of this paper is thus to concisely present the results of what
amounts to a simple although hitherto neglected comparative statics exer-
cise. In particular, we combine the ￿rst-order necessary conditions (FONCs)
obtained from a general principal-agent model. This allows us to restrict the
functional form of the optimal contract. We demonstrate the utility of these
restrictions by estimating several speci￿cations of a contract choice equa-
tion using data on the land tenancy contracts signed in rural Madagascar
(Bellemare, 2008).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we
present a general principal-agent model which explicitly accounts for wealth
e⁄ects, we state the main results obtained from manipulating the FONCs,
and discuss their empirical content. We then use Taylor expansions of the
slope of the optimal contract in section 3, which yields a structural contract
choice equation in which the slope of the contract (i.e., the level of risk
sharing) is regressed on four observable variables (i.e., the wealth levels of
the principal and the agent; the value of the agent￿ s outside option; and
output from the contract) and which yields a series of testable restrictions.
In section 4, we present the data as well as some summary statistics. We then
estimate several speci￿cations of our structural contract choice equation by
OLS, test the restrictions imposed by the theory, and discuss the limitations
of our approach and our data in section 5. Section 6 concludes by providing
directions for future research.
2 Theoretical Framework
Suppose a principal whose utility function is V (￿) with V 0 > 0 and V 00 ￿ 0
contracts with an agent whose utility function is U(￿) with U0 > 0 and U00 ￿ 0,
and let the initial wealth levels of the principal and the agent respectively
be zp and za. The principal￿ s ￿nal utility is de￿ned over zp + q ￿ w, where
q is the output from contract w, and conditional on ￿p, which embodies the
principal￿ s ￿type￿ . Likewise, the agent￿ s ￿nal utility is de￿ned similarly over
za + w and conditional on ￿a.
The agent produces output q by providing e⁄ort e, where output and
e⁄ort are linked by the probability density function f(qje) and where the
support of the distribution of output is Q =[q;q] The cost of e⁄ort to the
agent is  (e;￿a) with  
0 > 0 and  
00 > 0. The agent must receive at least
3U = U(za + c;￿a) in order to enter the contract, where c is de￿ned here as
the agent￿ s opportunity cost from entering the contract.















U[za + w(q);￿a]f(qje e)dq ￿  (e e;￿a)
￿
, (IC) (3)
where IR and IC denote the agent￿ s individual rationality and incentive
compatibility constraint, respectively. In most cases, the agent￿ s IC con-




U[za + w(q);￿a]fe(qje)dq ￿  e(e;￿a) = 0, (4)
where fe(qje) =
@f(qje)
@e and  e(e;￿a) =
@ (e;￿a)
@e . Suppressing the ￿ para-
meters for readability, we can now state the following results.
Proposition 1 Let w(q;zp;za;c) denote the optimal contract. Then, there
exist unique functions $ : Q ￿ R
2 ! R and ￿ : Q ￿ R
2 ! R such that
w(q;zp;za;c) = $(q;zp;za;c) ￿ za = ￿(q;zp;za;c) + zp for all q 2 Q.
Proof: See Appendix.
Corollary 2 If the principal is risk-neutral, then there exists a unique func-
tion $ : Q ￿ R ! R such that w(q;zp;za;c) = $(q;c) ￿ za for all q 2 Q.
Proof: See Appendix.
4Corollary 3 If the agent is risk-neutral, then there exists a unique function
$ : Q ￿ R ! R such that w(q;zp;za;c) = $(q;U ￿ [za + zp]) + U ￿ za for
all q 2 Q and a unique function a unique function ￿ : Q ￿ R ! R such that
w(q;zp;za;c) = ￿(q;za + zp ￿ U) + zp for all q 2 Q.
Proof: See Appendix.
3 Empirical Framework
Proposition 1 implies that the slope of the contract (i.e., the degree of risk
sharing within the contract, or wq = @w
@q ) varies in precise way with respect
to changes in the wealth levels of the principal and the agent, zp and za.
Speci￿cally,
wq = wq(q;za + zp;c + za;￿p;￿a), (5)
and note that q, za, zp, and c are in principle observable by the econome-
trician. A ￿rst-order Taylor expansion of wq then yields
wq = ￿0 + ￿zzp + (￿z + ￿c)za + ￿cc + ￿qq + ￿, (6)
where the ￿ parameters are to be estimated and ￿ is a nonstochastic error
term.





2 + (￿zz + 2￿zc + ￿cc)z
2
a
+￿zczpc + ￿qcqc + ￿qzqzp + (￿qz + ￿qc)qza
+(￿zz + ￿zc)zpza + (￿zc + ￿cc)cza + r, (7)
where the ￿ parameters are to be estimated and r is a nonstochastic error
term.
Assuming r is negligible (e.g., assuming that third-order e⁄ects are neg-
ligible, or if wq is approximately quadratic), then all of the ￿ coe¢ cients can
be estimated consistently. Letting x be a vector of the variables q, za, zp,
and c as well as their squares and interaction terms, then the reduced form
equation of interest is
5wq = ￿x + r. (8)
The parameter vector ￿, however, depends on ￿ = (￿p;￿a), such that ￿ =
￿(￿), and the problem is that ￿ is unobserved and varies across observations.
One way to control for this is is to include principal as well as agent ￿xed
e⁄ects, but we are not aware of any data set that includes multiple contracts
both per principal and per agent. Thus, for cross-sectional analysis, we are
interested in the moments of the distribution of ￿. Let ￿ = E(￿), and let
v = ￿￿ ￿. If r = 0 and E(vx) = 0, then ￿ can be consistently estimated
by ordinary least squares, the su¢ cient condition being the independence of
v and x. This obviously means that zp and za must be independent from ￿p
and ￿a.
Although our framework does not obviate the endogenous matching prob-
lem (Ackerberg and Botticini, 2002), it provides useful testable implications
that can help testing the internal consistency of the principal-agent problem.




4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data used in this paper were collected in Lac Alaotra, Madagascar, be-
tween March and August 2004. Lac Alaotra lies about 300 km northeast
of Antananarivo, the country￿ s capital, and is the country￿ s most important
rice-producing region. The survey methodology was as follows. First, the six
communes2 with the highest density of sharecropping around Lac Alaotra
were selected from a 2001 commune census conducted by Cornell Univer-
sity in collaboration with Madagascar￿ s Institut national de la statistique
(INSTAT) and Centre national de la recherche appliquØe au dØveloppement
(FOFIFA) (Minten and Raza￿ndraibe, 2003). Then, the two villages with
the highest density of sharecropping were chosen in each commune after
determining the density of sharecropping in each village by going through
communal records. In an e⁄ort to oversample sharecropping so as to in-
crease precision, ￿ve households known not to lease in or lease out land were
selected, ￿ve households known to lease in or lease out under a ￿xed rent
2A commune is an administrative unit that is roughly equivalent to a district in the
United States.
6contract were selected, and 15 households known to lease in or lease out un-
der a sharecropping contract were selected in each village. All households
were from within the sampling frame in each village, and the end result is a
sample of 300 selected households.3
For each selected household, plot-, household- and contract-level data
were collected. Household- and (leased-in) plot-level data for the tenants of
the 300 selected households as well as household-level and contract-level data
for the landlords of the 300 selected households were then collected, which
makes for a richer data set. A detailed discussion of the survey methodology
is available upon request.
Table 1 presents contract-level summary statistics, and note that P de-
notes principals (landlords) and A denotes agents (tenants). As regards the
structural variables, a little under 69 percent of the plots in our sample are
sharecropped, with the remainder under a ￿xed rent contract. The sum of
the values of the assets and the working capital owned is about $137 for
landlords, and about $86 for tenants.4;5 The opportunity cost of an hour for
the tenant is equal to $0.15, and we use this variable as a proxy for the value
of the tenant￿ s outside option, which we assume to be wage labor. Finally,
the average plot is worth $681 in these data, and we use this variable as
a proxy for the output generated in each contract, which we assume to be
a su¢ cient statistic for the plot￿ s average output so as to obviate the en-
dogeneity problem associated with regressing the tenant￿ s incentives on his
total output.
3The estimation results in this paper control for the oversampling of households that
enter sharecropping agreements by incorporating sampling weights. Ideally, one would
also control for the choice-based nature of the sample (Manski and Lerman, 1977). Unfor-
tunately, population proportions at the contract-level have never been collected in Mada-
gascar, making the choice-based sampling correction impossible to implement.
4The value of the household￿ s working capital is then de￿ned as the sum of the values of
its hoe, harrow, cart, plow, tractor, and small tractor. Finally, the value of the household￿ s
assets is de￿ned as the sum of the values of its non-productive assets, i.e., house, television,
radio, car, and bank account balance. The value of landholdings is omitted because of the
near impossibility of obtaining accurate values from respondents. The land sales market is
extremely thin in Madagascar, given that sales tend to occur for the most part in distress
situations (Randrianarisoa and Minten, 2001).
5US$1 ￿ 2,000 ariary.
7Turning to the control variables, 20 percent of the plots in our sample were
previously owned by a relative of the landlord, and the average plot covers 1.1
hectares. Almost 40 percent of plots are titled, 7 percent are tanety (hillside
plots), and 7.5 percent are bas-fonds (lowland plots). Well over three-quarters
of the plots, as one would expect from a sample of rice plots, and the average
distance between a landlord￿ s house and her plot is about a 30-minute walk.
The average landlord (tenant) household size is 5.5 (5.4) individuals, and
the average landlord (tenant) household￿ s dependency ratio is 0.45 (0.41).6
The average landlord (tenant) household head is 53 (39) years of age and
has about 5.4 (5.9) years of formal education. Moreover, approximately
20 percent of landlord household heads are female, and average landlord
(tenant) household income was about $58 ($48) per capita. Finally, the
average landlord-tenant pair has been contracting for over ￿ve years.
5 Estimation Results
Before estimating the structural principal-agent model derived in sections 2
and 3 by OLS, we ￿rst impute (i) the likelihood that a plot is titled; and (ii)
the value of the plot. Due to a mistake in survey design, these variables were
only collected for a subset of the households in the data, and so they need
to be imputed from observables.7
We present estimation and hypothesis test results for the structural principal-
agent model derived above in table 2. We start with the most parsimonious
speci￿cation, which only includes the variable speci￿ed by a ￿rst-order Tay-
lor expansion of the theoretical model (model 1). We then augment this
model by incorporating the variables from a second-order Taylor expansion
of the theoretical model (model 2) and by successively including plot-level
characteristics (model 3), landlord and tenant household-level characteristics
(model 4), and the landlord￿ s subjective perception of the likelihood that she
will lose her plot as a consequence of the contract chosen (model 5). Each col-
umn of table 2 thus nests the speci￿cation found in the previous column. In
every speci￿cation in table 2, the estimation results are probability-weighted
6The dependency ratio is the sum of the number of individuals under 15 and the number
of individuals over 64 divided by the total number of individuals in the household.
7Estimation results for these imputations are omitted for brevity, but they are available
from the authors upon request.
8due to the sampling scheme, and the standard errors are both bootstrapped
and robust.
Model 1
Because this model is the product of a ￿rst-order Taylor expansion, there is
only one testable restriction, i.e., (￿zp + ￿c) = ￿za. In this case, the ￿2(1)
test statistic is equal to 0.07, with a p-value of 0.79. So in the simplest case
of a ￿rst-order Taylor expansion, the data support the theoretical model of
section 2.
Model 2
Because this model is the product of a second-order Taylor expansion, there
are now ￿ve testable restrictions, i.e., (￿zp+￿c) = ￿za, (￿zpzp+2￿zpc+￿cc) =
￿z2
a, (￿qzp + ￿qc) = ￿qza, (￿zpzp + ￿zpc) = ￿zpza, and (￿zpc + ￿cc) = ￿cza. In
this case, the ￿2(5) test statistic is equal to 2.06, with a p-value of 0.84. So
when imposing more structure by applying a second-order Taylor expansion,
the data again support the theoretical model of section 2.
Model 3
The results for models 1 and 2 were as parsimonious as possible in that
they only included the variables of interest and market dummies. In this
model, we reestimate model 2 and incorporate plot characteristics. The ￿ve
testable restrictions are again (￿zp + ￿c) = ￿za, (￿zpzp + 2￿zpc + ￿cc) = ￿z2
a,
(￿qzp + ￿qc) = ￿qza, (￿zpzp + ￿zpc) = ￿zpza, and (￿zpc + ￿cc) = ￿cza. In this
case, the ￿2(5) test statistic is equal to 2.05, with a p-value of 0.84. So when
controlling for plot characteristics, the data support the theoretical model of
section 2.
Model 4
In this case, we reestimate model 3 and incorporate characteristics of the
landlord and tenant households. The ￿ve testable restrictions are again (￿zp+
￿c) = ￿za, (￿zpzp+2￿zpc+￿cc) = ￿z2
a, (￿qzp+￿qc) = ￿qza, (￿zpzp+￿zpc) = ￿zpza,
and (￿zpc + ￿cc) = ￿cza. In this case, the ￿2(5) test statistic is equal to
2.74, with a p-value of 0.74. So when controlling for plot characteristics
9and the characteristics of the landlord and the tenant, the data support the
theoretical model of section 2.
Model 5
In this case, we reestimate model 4 and incorporate the slope of the asset risk
function (i.e., the landlord￿ s subjective perception that she will lose her plot
as a result of the contract), which has been found to explain the emergence of
sharecropping contracts in these data by Bellemare (2008). The ￿ve testable
restrictions are again (￿zp+￿c) = ￿za, (￿zpzp+2￿zpc+￿cc) = ￿z2
a, (￿qzp+￿qc) =
￿qza, (￿zpzp + ￿zpc) = ￿zpza, and (￿zpc + ￿cc) = ￿cza. In this case, the ￿2(5)
test statistic is equal to 2.92, with a p-value of 0.71. So when controlling for
plot characteristics, the characteristics of the landlord and the tenant, and
the landlord￿ s perception of asset risk, the data still support the theoretical
model of section 2.
Limitations
The estimation results in table 2 and the empirical tests of model structure
we run above su⁄er from important limitations. First and foremost, none
estimated coe¢ cients for the structural variables zp, za, q, and c are indi-
vidually or jointly signi￿cant at any of the conventional levels in models 1
to 5. This lack of signi￿cance of the structural coe¢ cient estimates could
likely explain the structural test results we run for models 1 to 5. Yet these
structural variables are derived from the theoretical model in section 2 and,
as such, they must be included so as to accurately estimate a principal-agent
model by OLS. Perhaps more importantly, the sample at hand is small, which
could explain these results.
Moreover, we have had to rely on two proxies. First, since we do not
observe the value of the agent￿ s outside option, we had to assume that the
value to the agent of refusing to enter the contract was proportional to his
hourly wage, which implicitly assumes that the tenant￿ s outside option is
wage labor. Second, since output is most likely endogenous to contract choice
due to Marshallian ine¢ ciency, we had to rely on the value of the plot as a
su¢ cient statistic for the value of the plot￿ s output, which implicitly assumes
that there are no fertility dynamics, i.e., that the plot is equally productive
10from year to year. A better way of incorporating output would be to use the
previous period￿ s output, but this variable was not available in these data.
Finally, given the cross-sectional nature of our data, it is impossible to
control for ￿p and ￿a, i.e., the unobserved heterogeneity between principals
and agents. Doing so would require longitudinal data which includes more
than one observation for each principal and for each agent as well as enough
variation in the slope of the contract they select into. Unfortunately, this is
well-beyond the scope of these data, and we know of no data set that would
allow to control for both these sources of unobserved heterogeneity.
6 Conclusion
This paper has developed a structural method to estimate a general principal-
agent model by OLS. By combining the FONCs obtained from the canoni-
cal model, we restricted the functional form of the optimal contract, which
we then linearized using a Taylor expansion. Doing so provided us with a
structural contract choice equation estimable by OLS as well as with several
testable restrictions.
The advantages of our method are twofold. First and foremost, it allows
testing the canonical principal-agent model. In other words, provided one
has the required variables (i.e., the slope of the contract; the wealth lev-
els of the principal and the agent; the value of the agent￿ s outside option;
and the output from the contract), one can directly test the validity of the
principal-agent model. Second, it allows accurately estimating the marginal
e⁄ects of (i) the structural variables; (ii) any other variable of interest; and
(iii) the control variables, provided there are no statistical endogeneity prob-
lems. Perhaps more importantly, our results are applicable to both linear
and nonlinear contracts.
Applying our method to a sample of the land tenancy contracts signed
in rural Madagascar, we found empirical support for the canonical principal-
agent model in the data, but we were also careful to discuss the limitations
of our empirical work. Indeed, our sample size was small, and one of our
structural variables not only had to be proxied for, but the proxy itself had
to be imputed due to a mistake in survey design. These data issues could
explain our empirical results, so that we encourage future researchers to
11apply this method to larger, more carefully collected data so as to provide
applied contract theorists with more solid evidence in favor of or against the
canonical principal-agent model.
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13Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Fix U and suppress it as an argument. Let
e￿ = e(za;zp) denote the optimal e⁄ort level that solves the principal-agent
problem along with w(q;za;zp). Further let @xw denote the derivative of
w(q;za;zp) with respect to any argument x, keeping e￿ ￿xed. Applying the
Chain Rule to w, we thus have for z 2 fza;zpg,
wz = @zw + @ew ￿ @ze
￿. (9)
To establish the result, it su¢ ces to show that the following two claims
hold:
1. @zaw = @zpw ￿ 1 for all q 2 Q; and
2. @zae￿ = @zpe￿.
In showing both claims, it is helpful to refer to the implicit function for
the contract that is de￿ned by the corresponding ￿rst-order condition. That
is, de￿ne e w(q;￿;￿;za;zp;e) implicitly by
V 0[zp + q ￿ e w]
U0[za + e w]




Also denote e ￿(za;zp;e) and e ￿(za;zp;e) as the implicit functions de￿ned
through allowing e w(q;e ￿;e ￿;za;zp;e) to satisfy both the IR and IC constraints.
Applying the univariate Implicit Function Theorem to equation 10, one can
￿rst verify that
@za e w = @zp e w ￿ 1. (11)
Subsequently, applying the bivariate Implicit Function Theorem to the
system of equations de￿ned by the IR and IC constraints and using the
result in equation 11, one ￿nds that
@zae ￿ = @zpe ￿, and (12)
@zae ￿ = @zpe ￿. (13)
By noting that w(q;za;zp) ￿ e w(q;e ￿(za;zp;e￿);e ￿(za;zp;e￿);za;zp;e￿) and
applying the Chain Rule to e w, we have, for z 2 fza;zpg,
14@zw = @z e w + @￿ e w ￿ @ze ￿ + @￿ e w ￿ @ze ￿. (14)
Combining equations 11 to 14 establishes the ￿rst claim.
To establish the second claim, one must appeal to the First-Order Dy-









Q U[za + e w(q;e ￿(za;zp;e￿);e ￿(za;zp;e￿);za;zp;e￿)]fee(qje￿)dq
.
De￿ning G(za;zp;e￿) as the RHS of 15 and applying the univariate Im-
plicit Function Theorem yields
@ze
￿ = ￿
@zG ￿ @ze ￿
@eG ￿ @ee ￿
for z 2 fza;zpg. (16)
From equations 12, 13, and 16 it now su¢ ces to show that @zpG = @zaG.
Expanding @zpG and @zaG yields
@zpG =
R





































15Applying the ￿rst claim to equations 17 and 18 establishes the second
claim, i.e., @zae￿ = @zpe￿. Thus, wza = wzp ￿ 1 for all q 2 Q. Solving this
linear ￿rst-order partial di⁄erential equation yields the result. ￿
Proof of Corollary 1: When the principal is risk-neutral, then changing
zp has no e⁄ect on the optimal contract, i.e.,
@w(q)
@zp = 0. Applying Proposition
1 to this case yields
@w(q)
@za = ￿1. Keeping U constant, integrating over za,
and noting that the constant of integration depends on q and U yields the
result. ￿
Proof of Corollary 2: Given that
R
Q f(qje)dq = 1 and
R
Q fe(qje)dq = 0
for all e, increasing za when the agent is risk-neutral has no e⁄ect on the IC
constraint and has the same e⁄ect on the IR constraint as a decrease in U
by the same amount. Applying Proposition 1 to this case, one can choose a
function ￿(￿) such that w(q;za;U) = ￿(q;za + zp;U) ￿ za = ￿(q;zp;U ￿ za).
Totally di⁄erentiating both sides of the last equation with respect to U and
za yields
@za￿ + @U￿ = 1, (19)
where @za refers to the partial derivative of ￿ with respect to its second
argument. Note that above, ￿ is evaluated at (q;za + zp;U), i.e., the same
point for both partials. This is a linear ￿rst-order partial di⁄erential equation
whose general solution yields the desired result. ￿
16Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  N 
Sharecropping Dummy  0.687  (0.464)  387 
zp (1,000,000 Ariary)  0.273  (0.652)  380 
za (1,000,000 Ariary)  0.171  (0.275)  384 
c (1,000 Ariary)  0.294  (0.178)  383 
q (1,000,000 Ariary)  1.361  (0.890)  387 
Family-Owned Plot Dummy  0.199  (0.400)  387 
Plot Size (Ares)  109.809  (84.164)  387 
Titled Plot Dummy  0.384  (0.488)  125 
Tanety Dummy  0.070  (0.255)  387 
Bas-Fonds Dummy  0.075  (0.264)  387 
Irrigated Plot Dummy  0.755  (0.431)  387 
Distance from House (Walking Minutes)  33.013  (36.266)  387 
P Household Size (Individuals)  5.475  (2.807)  387 
P Household Dependency Ratio  0.450  (0.252)  387 
P Household Head Age (Years)  53.359  (16.391)  387 
P Household Head Female Dummy  0.196  (0.398)  387 
P Household Head Education (Years)  5.413  (3.882)  387 
P Household Income Per Capita (100,000 Ariary)  1.162  (2.349)  386 
Relationship Length (Years)  5.373  (7.433)  386 
Kin Contract Dummy  0.638  (0.481)  387 
A Household Size (Individuals)  5.753  (2.566)  384 
A Household Dependency Ratio  0.412  (0.216)  384 
A Household Head Age (Years)  39.036  (11.098)  384 
A Household Head Income (100,000 Ariary)  0.931  (1.484)  384 
A Household Head Education (Years)  5.927  (3.427)  384 
Slope of Asset Risk Function (ra)  -0.258  (3.960)  387 
 Table 2: Estimation Results for  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  Coefficient  (Std. Err.)  Coefficient  (Std. Err.)  Coefficient  (Std. Err.)  Coefficient  (Std. Err.)  Coefficient  (Std. Err.) 
zp  -0.02  (0.09)  0.33  (0.34)  0.25  (0.34)  0.35  (0.36)  0.38  (0.36) 
za  0.04  (0.12)  -0.03  (0.65)  0.00  (0.70)  0.35  (0.71)  0.30  (0.69) 
c  0.00  (0.19)  0.19  (0.80)  0.43  (0.81)  0.21  (0.83)  0.10  (0.82) 
q  0.03  (0.04)  0.01  (0.14)  -0.01  (0.20)  -0.16  (0.21)  -0.11  (0.20) 
zp
2      -0.03  (0.06)  -0.02  (0.06)  -0.02  (0.07)  -0.02  (0.07) 
za
2      -0.14  (0.27)  -0.13  (0.28)  -0.25  (0.28)  -0.20  (0.26) 
c
2      -0.21  (0.76)  -0.29  (0.72)  -0.17  (0.76)  -0.11  (0.78) 
q
2      -0.01  (0.04)  -0.04  (0.05)  -0.01  (0.05)  -0.01  (0.05) 
zp*q      -0.06  (0.11)  -0.04  (0.10)  -0.05  (0.11)  -0.08  (0.11) 
za*q      0.13  (0.19)  0.08  (0.20)  0.05  (0.21)  0.02  (0.20) 
c*q      0.13  (0.26)  0.06  (0.27)  0.19  (0.28)  0.18  (0.28) 
zp*c      -0.85  (0.70)  -0.86  (0.68)  -1.03  (0.71)  -1.03  (0.72) 
za*c      0.29  (1.86)  0.27  (2.01)  0.29  (2.01)  0.30  (1.93) 
zp*za      0.20  (0.55)  0.19  (0.54)  -0.03  (0.55)  0.02  (0.52) 
Family-Owned Plot          -0.11  (0.08)  0.18  (0.16)  -0.12*  (0.07) 
Plot Size          0.00*  (0.00)  0.21**  (0.13)  0.00*  (0.00) 
Titled Plot          0.15  (0.27)  -0.34  (0.16)  0.24  (0.27) 
Tanety          0.01  (0.17)  0.04  (0.17)  -0.01  (0.17) 
Bas-Fonds          -0.04  (0.17)  0.06  (0.17)  -0.04  (0.16) 
Irrigated Plot          -0.09  (0.10)  -0.24  (0.15)  -0.11  (0.10) 
Distance from House          0.00  (0.00)  -0.12  (0.29)  0.00  (0.00) 
P Household Size              0.05  (0.15)  0.01  (0.01) 
P Household Dependency Ratio              0.05  (0.14)  0.00  (0.13) 
P Household Head Age              -0.39*  (0.17)  0.00*  (0.00) 
P Household Head Female              -0.48  (0.19)  -0.02  (0.07) 
P Household Head Education              -0.12  (0.08)  -0.01  (0.01) 
P Household Income Per Capita              0.00  (0.00)  0.01  (0.01) 
Relationship Length              0.29  (0.28)  0.02  (0.01) 
Kin Contract              0.00  (0.18)  0.01  (0.07) 
A Household Size              -0.06  (0.17)  -0.02  (0.02) 
A Household Dependency Ratio              -0.10*  (0.10)  0.26*  (0.15) 
A Household Head Age              0.00  (0.00)  0.00  (0.00) 
A Household Head Income              0.01*  (0.01)  -0.05*  (0.02) 
A Household Head Education              0.00  (0.13)  -0.01  (0.01) 
Slope of Asset Risk Function (ra)                  0.03***  (0.01) 
Intercept  0.77***  (0.12)  0.73***  (0.23)  0.69**  (0.31)  1.06***  (0.39)  1.20***  (0.38) 
N  376  376  376  376  376 
Village Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Replications  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000 
R
2  0.19  0.21  0.23  0.30  0.33 
p-value (All Coefficients)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
p-value (Structural Coefficients)  0.94  0.99  0.99  0.94  0.97 